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 After the vigorous engagement of the international community, which re-
sulted in the Dayton Accord, Royamont Initiative, the EU’s Regional Approach, 
the SECI and, finally, the Stability Pact, it seems that the likeliness of new chal-
lenges to the security has been eliminated from Southeastern Europe. The in-
volvement of a number of significant international factors, plus the presence of 
military forces in the Balkans – whether through SFOR, KFOR or NATO – 
should all lead us to the conclusion that a possible outbreak of larger conflicts is 
impossible; moreover, even some other forms of insecurity are almost totally un-
der control. If the security of this region is to be compared to the situation in other 
parts of Europe, it can be said with certainty that the challenges to security will 
continue to have their local, as well as their universal foundations. This will make 
the demands of the international community and local forces – on condition they 
truly aspire towards Europe – much more dynamic and committed. Only by such 
systematic efforts will it be possible to overcome the existing situation and create 
the necessary pre-conditions for the integration of Southeast Europe into Europe 
proper. 
 
 Systematizing attempt  
 In an effort to systematize possible challenges, we could start from the division into 
the  military and the non-military threats. All the situations threatening with an outbreak 
of armed conflicts could be included in the first group of challenges. These include: the 
relations between Greece and Turkey, a further disintegration of Yugoslavia, the crea-
tion of the Kosovo state, or the emergence of a Greater Albania, and alike. It is obvious 
that these goals could hardly be achieved without the use of military force; also, some 
of these potential hotspots could lead to a further escalation of confrontation on a re-
gional scale.  
 The category of military threats should, by all means, include the unfinished process 
of conventional arms control within the CFE, which proves that the link with the re-
maining European space regarding the conventional arms control has not yet been fully 
established, as well as that the Balkans has not yet been fully incorporated into the 
European system. Although this setback can be offset by Annex II of the Dayton Ac-
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cord, it would be better if a comprehensive system – the one that would be linked to the 
OSCE system – was built. 
 Of course, these military challenges should, at this moment, be viewed conditionally 
as well. Given the presence of a plethora of international military forces, it would be 
difficult even to imagine an outbreak of hostilities, regardless of the strength of the in-
volved countries. International community has sufficient military power deployed on 
the ground to nip any spark of a military conflict in the bud, and the military campaign 
against Serbia has clearly showed that NATO will not tolerate any continuing warfare 
in the Balkans. 
 Therefore, it may be said that the non-military challenges are far more numerous 
and threatening. All the conflicts that have not been solved so far can be included in this 
group of challenges, regardless of whether they have their roots in history, ethnicity or 
religion; also, they all have their territorial manifestations. Furthermore, the problems 
connected with  economic development, experienced throughout the region, are due ei-
ther to common transitional hardships, specific (irrational) national solutions, or are a 
consequence of the economic devastation of the central state of the former Yugoslavia 
(Serbia). Such non-military threats can easily cross the line and become military ones, 
either by political decisions or by  a political leadership’s political choices.                
 Having in mind the fact that the line separating the military from the non-military 
challenges is a very thin one, perhaps the existing challenges in the Balkans could be 
divided by taking into account all the dangers that might lead to instability, regardless 
of their military or non-military character, and then list them as the challenges that 
could jeopardize the security and stability of this region. Within such a classification, 
the following division could be drawn: 
 - traditional Balkan conflicts; 
 - new conflicts, a consequence of newly gained independence; 
 - potential crisis points; 
 - new challenges to the security. 
 
 Traditional Balkan conflicts 
 The variety of religious, economic, political, military, and ethnic factors that the 
Balkan region is rife with, opens space for numerous possible conflicts. Some of them 
have obscure historical background, and have become an inseparable part of particular 
national determination and to a large extent influence the present positions of particular 
states.  
 Although nowadays these types of conflicts, regardless of their duration and their 
national background, are largely subdued due to the presence of the international com-
munity, their existence, and the possibility of their revival, should not be completely ig-
nored. 
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 – The conflicts between Greece and Turkey regarding the territorial demarcation in 
the Aegean Sea and the conflicts over Cyprus1 are the result not only of the different 
concepts of  political leadership, but are also grounded in distant historical events and 
their evocations by both nations. In spite of their NATO membership, the two countries 
have been unable to settle these issues and every new incident results in a mobilisation 
of all national forces for the protection of a country’s interests and positions. The rela-
tions between these two countries have affected NATO’s South Wing for years now, 
and in spite of all the efforts to build upon the European and trans-Atlantic common de-
nominators, all this has failed to improve them. Turkey’s efforts to join EU are reso-
lutely blocked by Greece, and even in their different positions regarding the wars on the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia, both countries have demonstrated their national 
ideas inherited from the past. 
 In Turkey they are aware of the fact that Turkey is a bigger and stronger country, 
but the integration of Greece into Europe offered a strong “joker” to Greece, to be re-
peatedly used to secure concessions from Turkey. Having in mind the depth of the crisis 
in their relations, as well as the unwillingness to change their perceptions of one an-
other, apparently such a situation will continue, and only eventually, when Turkey be-
comes a EU member as well – and then only maybe – all the tensions in their mutual re-
lations will disappear. 
 – The conflicts between Albania and Yugoslavia regarding Kosovo can be included 
in this category of traditional tensions as well. In the days of friendship and coopera-
tion, immediately after World War Two, when both countries belonged to the group of 
peoples’ democracies, both sides were claiming that this issue was unimportant. Even 
more, within the plan to create a Balkan socialist federation (along with Bulgaria), both 
countries were supposed to set an example for other countries. But, after the Comin-
form Resolution of 1948, the Enver Hoxha regime became most vocal in its diatribes 
against Yugoslavia; in them, Kosovo was made an issue of.  After Stalin’s death, their 
relations were normalized once again, but they never reached the level of the relations 
with other East European countries, and the Kosovo issue re-emerged on several occa-
sions. But the isolated Albania lacked the strength, as well as interested allies to support 
its claims. Only after the collapse of socialism, and Berisha’s rise to presidency, the 
question of Kosovo once again became central. In a sort of an attempt to divert attention 
from internal problems, Berisha advocated the unification of all Albanians in one coun-
try, and began calling for the internationalisation of the Kosovo issue. Milošević’s bru-
tal regime, manifested through its policy of genocide, first opened the space for the in-
ternationalization of the Kosovo issue, as well as for the engagement of various interna-
tional organisations and mediators, and later, by abandoning the negotiations in Ram-
bouillet, for the NATO military intervention. 
 The present situation, very specific in many elements, led to the deployment of the 
UN i.e. NATO and Russian forces, in Kosovo, to the return of Albanian refugees, to the 
exodus of Serbian and other non-Albanian population from Kosovo, the creation of 
 
1 The official Turkey adds to these the question of the Turkish minority in the Trakia region and argues 
that Greece refuses to recognize the ethnic identity of more than 150,000 Turks. 
Foreign Policy of Turkey, Ankara 1998, p. 16. 
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KFOR as the principal military, political and police force, and the ultimate exclusion of 
Kosovo from the Serbian state systems (monetary, energy, transport, economic, educa-
tional, etc.). Although both the West and Russia have recognized the fact that Kosovo is 
an integral part of Yugoslavia, not even a trace of this hypothesis can be detected in this 
situation. On the other hand, the West is resolutely expressing its opposition to any se-
cession of Kosovo and the changing of the borders. The obsession with the dangers that 
the change of borders could represent is still present, and is especially noticeable re-
garding the volatile Balkan territories. The basic idea is that of a controlled stabilization 
of the situation and the creation of a possibility for multi-ethnic life. According to 
President Clinton, the most important thing is “to preserve democracy, self-
determination, freedom, and that in these countries (meaning the Balkan countries) 
there would be no ethnic, religious or racial persecutions, regardless of the national 
borders”.2 This is, of course, a very reasonable approach, but the question is to what ex-
tent this will satisfy the Albanian population that views the expulsion of the Serbian au-
thority and Serbs as their freedom. It remains to be seen how many non-Albanians will 
return to Kosovo. Finally, UCK’s position regarding this issue will also be of signifi-
cance, since this is now the organisation that controls the majority of Albanians and 
seems to represent their political leadership in fulfilling their desire for a full secession 
from Yugoslavia.  
 If this came through, then certainly a new set of questions would arise. Namely, 
would an independent Kosovo become an independent state, would it become a part of 
the present Albania, or would it be the beginning of the emergence of a Greater Albania 
in which certain other parts populated by Albanian majorities would also be included 
(parts of Macedonia and Montenegro)? 
 In any case, the issue of Kosovo, and with that the Albanian-Serbian (Yugoslav) re-
lations as well, will remain a problem that surpasses regional significance. The interna-
tional engagement,3 as well as all other efforts aimed at restoring stability in these areas, 
make the Kosovo issue a broader international problem, a problem that will continue to 
test the willingness and abilities of the international community to act within the context 
of the new world order.                      
 – The dispute between Turkey and Bulgaria, although greatly toned down in recent 
times, remains. In a situation where over 800.000 Turks (Pomaks) live in Bulgaria, who 
were forcefully “bulgarized” during the previous socialist regime, it is difficult to estab-
lish normal relations overnight. And as the fundamentalism of Muslim provenance is in 
different parts of the Balkans often mentioned as one of the most dangerous threats, in 
all the communities with Muslim population there is distrust regarding their true com-
mitment and inclusion in the  state they live in. In the calculations regarding Muslims in 
the Balkans as a destabilizing factor, and with the fears of the emergence of fundamen-
talism in these areas, Bulgaria with its considerable Muslim-Pomak population has an 
important place. Nevertheless, the results achieved in the incorporation of Pomaks into 
the Bulgarian social, political and economic life are encouraging for future relations, 
 
2 President Clinton during a conversation with journalists in Sarajevo, Feral Tribune, 9/8/99. 
3 For more, see: Kosovo and NATO: Impending Challenges, Washington 1999. 
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especially since Bulgaria has committed itself to the European path, which means 
strong imperatives for respecting human and minority rights.4  
 – The relations between Romania and Hungary, due to the status of Hungarians liv-
ing in Romania, were at certain post-cold war periods quite tense. In Causescu’s times 
the policy of national homogenization demanded that all Romanian citizen demonstrate 
their loyalty to the nation i.e. the state. The large Hungarian population in Transylvania 
had a strong sense of national identity and the fall of Causescu’s regime was expected 
to create better conditions for them in Romania. Although there was no chance that 
Romania would cede Transylvania back to Hungary, in various Romanian Hungarian 
circles and in Hungary, attempts were made to obtaining full autonomy, which would 
then lead to the demands for self-determination. Romanian authorities were firmly 
against such a course of events, and sometimes it was suggested that the situation called 
for a future deployment of European forces. It is interesting to mention that the then 
WEU Secretary, Van Eckler, mentioned the relations between Romania and Hungary as 
a possible testing ground for the WEU action. 
 This did not happen, and both states have demonstrated some restraint. This restraint 
was primarily a result of the EU pressures, which made it clear to both states that there 
will be no closer relations with the EU for them unless they establish normal relations 
between their two neighbouring countries. Also, both countries were influenced by their 
desire to join the Partnership for Peace. This all led to the agreement on bilateral rela-
tions, which, in part, regulates the issue of Hungarian minority in Romania.5 
 On the other hand, Romania also has certain claims on Dobruja, as well as on 
Moldova. At first, Romanian politicians expected that Moldova, the state created out of 
the Socialist Republic of Moldova after the collapse of the Soviet Union, was to be 
united with Romania. As that did not happen, certain discontent was noticeable in Bu-
charest, illustrated by the statements that Moldova had formerly been a Romanian terri-
tory and that it would be only natural if the two countries united. But, since in Romania, 
like in Moldova, besides the population of Romanian descent, live Ukrainians, Rus-
sians, Turks, Jews, and Bulgarians, it became clear that the eventual unification with 
Romania would mean the beginning of new dramatic events. As a result of the fears that 
Moldova would become a part of Romania, the Ukrainian and Russian population cre-
ated the Transdniester Republic in south Moldova in 1990, which still exists.  
 At present, Romania is occupied with its internal problems, which will obviously be 
very difficult to solve, unless the country quickly speeds up its pace of accommodation 
with Europe. At the same time, this is the principal reason to leave all the demands that 
could give rise to nationalism behind, since it is clear to the majority of Romania’s po-
litical forces that Europe would not tolerate such a development. Romania, aware that 
its inclusion in the next group of future EU members is in its best interest, and with the 
Associating Agreement with the EU already in place, considers Europe its priority, 
which in practice limits the scope of action for those nationalistic forces that would cur-
tail autonomy for Hungarians, or demand some territorial changes. Besides, the new 
 
4 Ts. Tsvetkov, Bulgarian Security Policy: Alternatives and Choice, Gröningen 1999, p. 33. 
5 A. Agh, The Politics of Central Europe, London 1998, p. 157. 
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Moldovan independence is becoming a commonly accepted fact, and the Moldovan po-
litical structures are far from seeking any kind of unification with Romania which, eco-
nomically, is not a very attractive option.  Moldova is nowadays expecting much more 
from the SECI and the eventual rapprochement with the EU, since this is viewed as the 
only way for its faster development and for overcoming economic hardships. 
 
 New Balkan traumas and new independence 
 – The disintegration of the federal state of Yugoslavia triggered off the emergence 
of some new disputes, and also strengthened a number of previous animosities among 
certain nations in this area. It is almost certain that numerous disputes will continue to 
fester due to these problems, while the international community will have to continue 
with careful monitoring of the behaviour of the new states.  
 – The relations between Croatia and Serbia have their roots in their coexistence in 
the two previous Yugoslav states, as well as in the war that erupted after the collapse of 
Yugoslavia. The Dayton Accord, and especially the Agreement on the Normalisation of 
Relations between the two states (1996), initiated the process of gradual normalization. 
The issue of Prevlaka remains an open sore, since Croatia views it solely as a security 
issue, while Yugoslavia demands the change of the border in its favour. There are also 
questions connected with the return of refugees and numerous property issues. Finally, 
the issue of the restitution of war damages suffered by Croatia could come up as well. 
 Although the relations between the two countries have entered a phase of a sort of 
“cold peace”, it is obvious that time, and the instruments of the international commu-
nity, will influence the development of better relations. It is only understandable that 
between the two countries which existed within the same state for several decades, nu-
merous links and connections were created, ranging from personal to economic and cul-
tural links that will continue to exist and develop. Naturally, some changes – democra-
tization among them –  should occur first, as a precondition for developing better rela-
tions – which should this time be founded on mutual interests, rather than on some pan-
Slavic illusions or “brotherhood and unity”. The very moment when interests become 
the basis for developing good neighbourly relations, these two countries will demon-
strate their readiness for establishing the European type of relations.       
 – The disputes between Croatia and Slovenia, although not major, are felt in bilat-
eral relations of the two countries. The current demarcation in the Bay of Piran does not 
satisfy Slovenia, and is an issue generating other, sharper political accents occasionally 
heard on both sides. It is plausible that this question can be solved relatively easily, as 
can be the problems connected with the Krško nuclear plant and the restitution of dam-
ages to the Croatian clients of Ljubljanska Banka. It is obvious that the creation of a 
better political climate, as well as certain accommodation in the political positions of 
both countries would help that these problems are overcome. But even as they are, these 
issues are not of the nature that could lead to significant tensions in the area.  
 – The Macedonian-Greek dispute is a consequence of the collapse of Yugoslavia 
and the creation of an independent Macedonian state. Greeks immediately rejected Ma-
cedonian claims that a large number of Macedonians live in Greece; at the same time 
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they found – in the Macedonian flag and in some constitutional provisions dealing with 
the protection of Macedonians abroad – the justification for the resolute Greek rejec-
tions of the new state. Analysing the creation of Macedonia primarily through the prism 
of the relations between Greece and Turkey, one of the more serious reasons for Greek 
concern is the question of the further development of the relations between Macedonia 
and Turkey. Any new infiltration of Turkey in the Balkans is something that Greeks 
would like to prevent at any cost.6 But the initial mobilization of national sentiment on 
both sides gradually gave way to the easing of tensions. Greece finally lifted the block-
ade which completely cut off Macedonia in the south, an agreement on the alterations in 
the Macedonian national flag and some provisions of the Constitution was reached, 
while the question of the official name – the Republic of Macedonia – remains open.  
 It can be expected that the Kosovo crisis, along with all other consequences, will 
have a positive impact on the relations between Macedonia and Greece, since they both 
have a vested interest in the peace on the Balkans, and thus in overcoming the existing 
disputes among them.  
 – The relations between Macedonia and Bulgaria are also very complex. Although 
Bulgaria was the first country to recognize the independent Macedonia, nevertheless it 
does not recognize the existence of the Macedonian nation, and occasionally comes up 
with the  interpretations that Macedonians are actually Bulgarians. This could, in some 
other circumstances – if Bulgaria had some other possibilities and abilities – result in 
additional dangers for Macedonia, particularly if Macedonia became imbroiled in some 
internal problems (for example, an attempt at the separation of the western parts of Ma-
cedonia populated mostly by the Albanian minority). However, since the international 
community is firmly present in Macedonia, with the goal of establishing a lasting peace 
in the whole area, it is obvious that such Bulgarian aspirations cannot be realized. Be-
sides, Bulgaria also sees its future within Europe, therefore the EU has sufficient re-
sources to eliminate this dispute with minimal efforts. 
 
 Potential points of crisis 
 If the list of new disputes contains issues that do not threaten with some serious dis-
turbances, especially after the NATO campaign against Yugoslavia, the set of open 
questions and potential new hot spots looks quite different. 
 – Among these, the dominant questions are those concerning further development, 
and even survival, of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The formula: one state, two entities and 
three nations should satisfy all the existing interests in the best and most democratic 
manner. Nevertheless, if one tried to imagine such a development in another environ-
ment, and having in mind the recent war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as other 
historical experiences – the state ones and the national ones – then such an outcome 
might seem very dubious.7 Optimists, who believe that after the war and all the suffer-
 
6 D. Triantaphyllou, “The Greek Approach in the Balkans”, The Southeast European Yearbook 1997-
1998, Athens, 1998, pp. 212-214. 
7 For example, see: M. O. Hanion, “Bosnia: Better Left Partitioned”, Washington Post, April 10, 1997. 
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ing, certain critical mass that supports peace, development and stability has been cre-
ated, find that the international presence, as well as the willingness to keep it there for a 
longer period of time, is the crucial component of future stability. And it is this question 
of the duration of international presence that acts both as a controller and a protector 
and within which the possibility of the preservation of this model should be viewed. 
 If the international community forces – the sign of its political, military and eco-
nomic commitment (which should, in time, lead to the creation of a new, democratic 
society) – remain present in Bosnia and Herzegovina long enough, then it could be ex-
pected for this model to work. In such a case the return of the refugees and displaced 
persons could occur, and the preconditions for a multi-cultural coexistence and a degree 
of mutual prosperity can be created. Of course, the key question is – how long? Three 
or five years would not be long enough; a decade or two should be optimal.  
 In another, extremely pessimistic scenario, all the aforementioned hypotheses would 
fall apart at the moment when this time period was shortened, or if the international 
community rapidly withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina. In that case, the three-
sided formula would dissolve, and the conflicts over the return of the refugees, over ter-
ritory, revenge and alike  would recommence, with all the sides seeking allies for their 
cause abroad. 
 – The country that has been radiating instability in the Balkans for the past ten years 
still  represents the most serious challenge to the Balkan security today, and still re-
mains the biggest enigma. SR Yugoslavia, at the time of the  – probable – agony of 
Milošević’s regime, is tearing along the seams. Montenegro is on the brink of separa-
tion, Kosovo can be practically written off, Sandžak is demanding autonomy, and the 
ethnic Hungarians – supported by the nationalist political forces from Hungary – aspire 
for a full secession from Yugoslavia. 
 Milošević’s regime, which has hardly survived, and has sustained on crises, and 
which has at the same time lost every war, is today facing challenges to the very territo-
rial survival of SR Yugoslavia, as well to its own survival. 
 In this dramatic breakup of Yugoslavia, the international community, for the time 
being at least, is not willing to go all the way. The Montenegrin proposal for the crea-
tion of an alliance of two states – Montenegro and Serbia – was endorsed neither by 
Washington nor by Western Europe, nor by Moscow. Kosovo is still a part of Yugosla-
via, and assurances have been given that it will remain so. Sandžak and Vojvodina 
might perhaps gain some level of autonomy, but it would be difficult to envisage the in-
ternational community supporting their full secession from SR Yugoslavia. The world 
would primarily like to see democratic changes taking place in Belgrade, which would 
create the basis for subsequent democratic solutions of all other problems. It is expected 
that within a democratic Yugoslavia the problems related to the union with Montene-
gro, and the autonomy of the multi-ethnic Kosovo, Sandžak and Vojvodina could be 
solved. In this way, the question of changing borders would be avoided, since no one is 
 
H. A. Kissinger, “Limits to What U.S. Can Do in Bosnia”, Washington Post, September 22, 1977. 
J. J. Mearsheimer, “The Only Exit From Bosnia”, New York Times, October 7, 1997. 
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keen on renewing it; this would most probably result in new, long-lasting tensions in 
the Balkans. 
 The question remains which are the forces that should carry out these democratic 
changes and open the doors to democratization? It is also clear that such democratiza-
tion would not be limited to Serbia, but would spread all over the region in the form of 
a universal process of build-up of civic societies, elimination of war criminals, respect 
of human and minority rights and acceptance of the European codes of behaviour. Even 
if we are getting closer to such solutions, the process is still too slow.  
 – Territorial and minority issues, unless a high level of democratization and Eu-
ropeization of the Balkans is achieved, will continue to present a significant problem in 
these areas, and a constant challenge to security. Not a single territorial or minority 
question in the Balkans has been completely solved so far, and following the recent war 
it is obvious that it will be even more difficult to solve them.  
 The question of Albanians, who live in Albania as well as in Kosovo, Montenegro, 
Serbia,  Macedonia and in Greece, remains unsolved. Will it be enough to guarantee 
human and minority rights in their case, or should a creation of a unique Albania be al-
lowed? 
 Milošević’s policy has further complicated the Serbian question. That policy re-
sulted in a large number of Serbian refugees from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Kosovo, who were practically forced to live in one country. Their return is slow and in 
many cases questionable, which leaves thus issue open. Perhaps a universal Europeiza-
tion of the Balkans is the only solution to this question as well. 
 The same can be applied to the Macedonian national question, since some Macedo-
nians live in Bulgaria and Greece. 
 For the advocates of small national states, the Muslim question should also be put 
on the agenda, since a large number of Muslims live outside Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Sandžak). 
 Therefore, when listing all these potential challenges to security, it must be con-
cluded that in the present circumstances it is easier and, at the same time, more difficult 
to solve these issues. Easier, since the Balkans ceased to depend exclusively on the ac-
tions of the Balkan factors and their “ways” of solving problems; more difficult since 
the outrageous bloodshed and suffering of the past decade in this area are difficult to 
ignore or forget. All these challenges may be controlled only by careful policies of the 
international community, its efforts to understand both the historical and the present re-
lationships, and its willingness and commitment to keep its presence in the area for a 
longer time, since as long as the forces of the international community are stationed in 
the Balkans, it would be hard to imagine any  conflicts, even attempts at the realization 
of some national aspirations by force. This is certainly encouraging, but at the same 
time it encumbers the international community with many obligations regarding their 
activity in connection with further developments in this part of Europe. 
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 New challenges to security 
 In a classical sense, the new challenges to the security in this region arise from the 
geostrategic position of Southeastern Europe, from a permanent lack of resources 
needed for the organisation of a modern and efficient military force, from the non-
existence of stronger bilateral and/or multilateral alliances (apart from the Partnership 
for Peace) and from the attempts to create the pre-conditions for multilateral linking i.e. 
NATO membership, as soon as possible. 
 This projection is also the basis on which almost all of these countries, with the ex-
ception of Milošević’s Yugoslavia, see their future security, which should also guaran-
tee as fast as possible the inclusion of the entire region into the European and trans-
Atlantic integrations. 
 Along with these usual issues that represent threats to the security, or traditional 
challenges that are connected with the deployment and use of military force, new forms 
of challenges are also emerging. The transition from the socialist regime into a capitalist 
system accelerated the opening of the whole area of Eastern Europe, as well as the ac-
tivities of organized crime; all this has led to the situation in which Southeast Europe is 
also becoming faced with different kinds of new challenges to the security. New immi-
gration patterns, terrorism, arms and drugs trafficking, prostitution and enormous 
spread of organized crime, are parts of such non-traditional challenges whose conse-
quences are increasingly felt. 
 – New immigration patterns represent a major issue in these areas, situated at the 
crossroads of several regions (East European, Russian, Balkan, Middle Eastern) and 
where practically every country has problems connected to uncontrolled immigration. 
Whether they are used as transport venues, mostly to the West, or as targets for illegal 
entries, the immigration is characterized by a number of social and economic problems. 
Large profits are  earned on “smuggling” people from various countries, where organ-
ized groups already exist for conducting such activities. Some immigrants are used by 
the mob as cheap labour force or for prostitution. In the situation in which all the coun-
tries of the region lack financial resources for effective border controls, the possibilities 
for new immigration channels are created. 
 - Terrorism has deep roots, especially in the Balkans, and may easily find fertile soil 
in national and ethnic conflicts, as well as in the consequences of recently ended war 
conflicts. Minority groups, if unsatisfied with their status, or strengthened nationalist 
movements (as was recently the case with the Serb rebellion in Croatia) may easily be-
come pray of the organizers of terrorist activities. 
 But there is always the question of outside support which makes the fight against 
terrorism even more difficult. Unresolved national questions may always serve as the 
grounds for the inclusion of outside elements, either connected to some state, or to some 
groups of organized crime that will use the situation to their own advantage. 
 – Arms and drug trafficking are expanding rapidly after the cold war system of rela-
tions dissolved. The geography of this area, as well as the wars fought on the territories 
of former Yugoslavia, have all created an opportunity for a wide zone surrounding it to 
earn extra profits from arms trade. The arms embargo, which has proved – for the nth 
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time – inefficient, has only increased the price of arms that were supplied to all the war-
ring parties. In that way, huge extra profits were made, and despite the fact that the wars 
are now over, the whole southeastern Europe will continue to feel the consequences of 
this for some time. Simultaneously with the arms trafficking, the channels for drugs 
were opened. In many cases, the routes for drug trafficking were in place in this area 
even before the recent events, as part of the transit routes across Southeast Europe, but a 
large part of the expansion can be attributed to the recent wars. The question of finances 
needed for the arms was relatively easily compensated by the drug trade or by securing 
its transit, which all added to the problems of Southeastern Europe: an increase of local 
drug production, international trafficking routes passing through it, and all this in-
creased the number of domestic users and addicts. 
 – The wave of prostitution that has swept the area of Southeastern Europe can also 
be linked to the breakup of socialism in the East, to the new freedom of movement and 
travel, transitional crises and failures, and to the wars in the former Yugoslavia. A large 
number of prostitutes from the East, mostly from Ukraine, Russia and Romania, in their 
efforts to get to the West, spend some time in these areas. In an environment of unregu-
lated social relations, with the possibility for blackmail and extortion, many of them be-
come victims of organized crime and their merciless exploitation. It is believed that at 
this moment there are over a thousand prostitutes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, mostly 
from the East, who are generating profits for all kinds of criminals, as well as for some 
corrupt government officials.  
 – The spread and growth of the forces of organized crime is certainly one of the 
most significant security risks in Southeastern Europe. At the same time, it represents a 
major threat to political stability and economic development. Exploiting chaos, insecu-
rity, lack of proper organization and nonexistence of the rule of law, the organized 
crime have established their strongholds in Southeastern Europe and created links with 
high-ranked political officials and parts of the military establishments. Such a network, 
at the time of very slow transitional processes, has resulted in the emergence of special 
interest groups, deepened the polarization of internal forces, led to radicalisation and – 
especially dangerous – constantly undermines the confidence of citizens in the possibil-
ity of establishing the rule of law. 
 Different national mafias (Russian, Turkish, Italian, Albanian, and Serbian) have 
managed relatively easily to find and agree over mutual interests and have sufficient 
space for their activities. To a large extent, the Turkish mafia controls the area of Bul-
garia and partly Macedonia, the Russian mafia has traditionally been strong in Bulgaria 
and today is the strongest in Serbia, the Italian mafia in Montenegro and Albania, while 
the Albanian organized crime is getting increasingly internationalized with a diversified 
network stretching from Albania and Kosovo to Western Europe. Arms and drugs traf-
ficking, gambling, money laundering, real estate purchasing, attempts to sell nuclear 
technology and materials flourished during the wars, the situation especially acute in 
the territories of the former Yugoslavia. 
 The crisis in Albania led to an enormous growth of Albanian organized crime, 
which is, it seems, presently stronger than the state. Prostitution, arms and drugs traf-
ficking, cigarette contraband, transport of immigrants, and oil trade are just some of Al-
banian mob operations, and they are now spreading in the direction of Kosovo. This 
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represents a threat for Kosovo as it could be completely engulfed by the Albanian ma-
fia, the situation which would aggravate the gradual easing of tensions and impede in-
ternational activities.  
 The criminal activities, conducted by organized crime groups, are already multi-
ethnic in their character, and with some exceptions, the area of their operations is the 
entire Southeastern Europe. By eliminating the mechanisms of state control and protec-
tion, organized crime represents one of the largest sources of crime and corruption 
which undermines internal relations in a society, stands in the way of foreign invest-
ment, of economic growth and institutional development of democratic forms of gov-
ernment throughout the area. 
 The forms of cooperation among the states of the region in fighting crime have 
mostly been bilateral or Interpol-based, but that is not enough. Romania has, for exam-
ple, established the centre for investigating and combating organized crime, Bulgaria 
has launched a campaign against crime and corruption, and the international community 
is advocating for the same to be done in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Similar campaigns 
have been launched in other countries as well. But all this has had a very limited effect 
on eliminating crime. It is obvious that these countries are faced with a completely new 
situation, which occupies a very high place on the list of non-traditional challenges to 
the security in Southeastern Europe. Although it could be argued that this is a develop-
ment characteristic for all post-socialist societies, it must be added that in Southeastern 
Europe, due to the recent wars in the region, the situation is much more complex. What 
is increasingly needed is a firm hand and action of the state bodies against the joint ac-
tivities of political officials and organized crime, the creation of pre-conditions for co-
operation at the regional level with the establishment of joint agencies, and even joint 
police forces, the fastest possible inclusion of Southeastern Europe into the existing 
European systems which would help the stabilisation of the area and, at the same time, 
hasten the elimination of all those forms of corruption and crime which have become 
characteristic for the region.  
 If the security of this region is to be compared to the situation in other parts of 
Europe, it can be said with certainty that the challenges to security will continue to have 
their local, as well as their universal foundations. This will make the demands of the in-
ternational community and local forces – on condition they truly aspire towards Europe 
– much more dynamic and committed. Only by such systematic efforts will it be possi-
ble to overcome the existing situation and create the necessary pre-conditions for the in-
tegration of Southeast   Europe into Europe proper.                                
Translated by the author 
